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Abstract
This paper proposes a novel tariff scheme and a new optimization framework in order to address the recovery of fixed
investment costs in transmission network planning, particularly against rising demand elasticity. At the moment, ex-post
network tariffs are utilized in addition to congestion revenues to fully recover network costs, which often leads to over/under
fixed cost recovery, thus increasing the investment risk. Furthermore, in the case of agents with elastic market curves, ex-post
tariffs can cause several inefficiencies, such as mistrustful bidding to exploit ex-post schemes, imperfect information in applied
costs and cleared quantities, and negative surplus for marginal generators and consumers. These problems are exacerbated
by the increasing price-elasticity of demand, caused for example by the diffusion of demand response technologies. To
address these issues, we design a dynamic ex-ante tariff scheme that explicitly accounts for the effect of tariffs in the long-
term network planning problem and in the underlying market clearing process. Using linearization techniques and a novel
reformulation of the congestion rent, the long-term network planning problem is reformulated as a single mixed-integer
linear problem which returns the combined optimal values of network expansion and associated tariffs, while accounting for
price-elastic agents and lumpy investments. The advantages of the proposed approach in terms of cost recovery, market
equilibrium and increased social welfare are discussed qualitatively and are validated in numerical case studies.
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Nomenclature
Sets and Indices
F̄m set of possible lumpy capacity expansions for line
m, with F̄m =
⋃
j∈J F̄m,j
i index of a discrete tariff level, with i ∈ I
I set of discrete tariff levels
j index of a lumpy capacity expansion, with j ∈ J
J set of lumpy capacity indices
k index of a consumer, with k ∈ ΩDt
` index of a loop, with ` ∈ L
L set of loops
m index of a line, with m ∈M
M set of lines
n index of a node, with n ∈ N
N set of nodes
p index of a producer, with p ∈ ΩGt
t index of a time period, with t ∈ T
T number of time periods
T set of time periods, with T = {1, ..., T}
ΩDt,n set of consumers in node n
ΩDt set of all consumers, i.e., Ω
D
t = ∪nΩDt,n
ΩGt,n set of producers in node n
ΩGt set of all producers, i.e., Ω
G
t = ∪nΩGt,n
Parameters
am,n element of the network incidence matrix AM×N .
It holds am,n = 1 (am,n = −1) if the positive
power flow on line m exits (enters) from node n.
In all other cases, am,n = 0
dmaxt,k maximum quantity demanded by consumer k at
time t
F 0m existing capacity on the line m
F̄m,j lumpy capacity expansion for line m, with j ∈ J
gmaxt,p maximum quantity offered by producer p at time
t
Kfixm fixed cost of building or expanding line m
Kvarm variable cost of building or expanding line m
p̃Dt,k bid demand price by consumer k at time t with-
out network costs
p̃Gt,p bid offer price by producer p at time t without
network costs
δm,n allocation factor for cost distribution among
market participants
τ̄m,i discretized transmission tariff applied on line m,
with i ∈ I
ψ`,m element of the sensitivity matrix ΨL×M repre-
senting the reactance of line m in loop `.
ωt weighting factor.
Functions
Bk(dt,k) benefit function for consumer k
Cp(gt,p) cost function for producer p.
Variables
bFm,j binary variable equal to one if the lumpy invest-
ment in additional capacity F̄m,j for line m is
made, and zero otherwise
bτm,i binary variable equal to one if the tariff τ̄m,i is
applied on line m, and zero otherwise
dt,k accepted demand for consumer k at time t
ft,m flow in the line m at time t
gt,p accepted generation for producer p at time t
pDt,k bid demand price by consumer k at time t in-
cluding network costs
pGt,p bid offer price by producer p at time t including
network costs
τm transmission tariff applied on line m
um binary variable equal to one if linem is expanded,
and zero otherwise.
Dual variables and associated constraint
πt,n power balance constraint at time t in node n
γt,` Kirchhoff’s voltage law constraint for loop ` at
time t
µmaxt,m maximum flow constraint at time t in line m
µmint,m minimum flow constraint at time t in line m
ϕD,maxt,k maximum demanded quantity constraint for con-
sumer k at time t
ϕG,maxt,p maximum offered quantity constraint for pro-
ducer p at time t
Auxiliary variables
yb
Fµ,max
t,m,j it replaces the product b
F
m,jµ
max
t,m
yb
Fµ,min
t,m,j it replaces the product b
F
m,jµ
min
t,m
yb
τd
t,m,i,k it replaces the product b
τ
m,idt,k
yb
τg
t,m,i,p it replaces the product b
τ
m,igt,p
1. Introduction
In the near future, an unprecedented amount of network
investments will be necessary to accommodate the substantial
shifts in generation and demand caused by increasing pene-
tration of renewable energy resources, and electrification of
transportation and heating [1]. The current costs due to con-
gestions in the electrical network in Europe amount to more
than e2.4 billion and are expected to further increase. For
this reason, a significant number of grid expansion projects
are planned in the short and medium term [2]. Globally,
the estimated cost of the planned transmission investments
in the next 15 years amounts to $ 1.7 trillion [3]. In this sce-
nario, it is of paramount importance that current paradigms
for transmission network planning are properly updated to
sustain the development of a sound, secure, and affordable
energy system.
A comprehensive survey of the main challenges in trans-
mission network planning, from both an economic and an en-
gineering point of view, is reported in [4]. Some of the most
relevant issues that are currently being tackled include: i)
combining the planning of transmission expansions with new
synchronous plants [5] and additional wind generation [6],
ii) accounting for planning uncertainties [7] and iii) develop-
ing new investment paradigms for transmission expansion in
deregulated power markets. An overview of this last point is
provided in [8] and some market and game-theory approaches
are presented in [9] and [10], respectively.
A wide array of different planning methodologies is also
being considered. Reference [11] proposes a novel frame-
work to incorporate transmission planning decisions in pay-
as-bid auctions (such as those for competitive renewable en-
ergy procurement) in order to obtain a reduction of the long-
term total system cost. Reference [12] presents a security-
constrained co-planning of transmission line expansion and
energy storage in the presence of high penetration of wind
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power. The proposed approach is based on a Bender de-
composition algorithm, where the master problem handles
the planning phase, whereas the sub-problem introduces cor-
rective post-contingency actions to minimize the costs under
fault conditions. Reference [13] proposes a proactive method
in planning for transmission network expansion by taking into
account also generation expansion decisions. The resulting
formulation is cast as a mathematical program with equilib-
rium constraints, which is solved with a specifically developed
algorithm. An interesting analysis of how different network
configurations and transmission expansion planning decisions
can result in different attributions of carbon emission respon-
sibilities to consumers is reported in reference [14]. Uncer-
tainty in network planning is another important issue that
may lead to inefficient decisions, in particular in the context
of very high renewable energy penetration. In this sense, ref-
erence [15] proposes a data-driven scenario generation frame-
work for transmission expansion to account for unseen but
important load and wind power scenarios while considering
inter-spatial dependencies between loads and wind genera-
tion outputs, by using a vine-copula approach. Note that,
the presence of tariffs and price-sensitive market players can
have an impact not only on transmission planning but also on
generation expansion planning, which is a strictly connected
problem [16], as well as on ancillary service markets [17].
1.1. Motivation
A key general aspect of transmission expansion planning
that still exhibits several unresolved issues is the full and ef-
ficient recovery of the investment costs and in particular of
fixed costs [18]. This is a well-known problem that has been
analysed extensively [19]. One of the first proposed solution
from a general economic perspective has been the introduc-
tion of Ramsey pricing [20], which has been further anal-
ysed in a power system context by Boiteux in [21] and [22].
However, this approach only considers monopolies in a fully-
regulated environment and does not include market interac-
tions between generation and demand. Several alternative
approaches have been proposed, such as two-part tariffs [23]
and non-linear pricing methods [24]. Despite these contribu-
tions, the recovery of fixed costs remains a topic with several
open questions, such as the impact of new technologies on
network charging [25] and a fair allocation of the network
costs among the different network participants [26].
Currently, network expansion costs are recovered through
congestion rent and tariffs. At the moment, network charges
are not harmonized between countries, and usually each na-
tion applies its own tariff scheme, which can significantly dif-
fer from the others. In this sense, a comprehensive review of
the different tariff approaches adopted in Europe and North
America is presented in [27] and [28]. The specific examples
of TNUoS in UK and TUoS in Australia are discussed in [29]
and [30], respectively. These tariffs are generally levied on a
capacity or energy basis and each country has set different
allocations of charges between generation and load. A subset
of countries, such as Great Britain, Ireland and Norway, con-
sider locational signals and envisage different payments for
generator and demand, depending on the area in which they
operate.
A fundamental point is that all the discussed network tar-
iff schemes are applied ex-post, without accounting for their
effect on both price-sensitive consumers and producers [31].
This means that the clearing process in electricity markets
does not properly consider the effect of network tariffs on the
accepted quantities and on the market clearing prices. This
approach can lead to several inefficiencies, such as cleared
orders which result in a negative surplus and mistrustful bid-
dings due to the risk of distorting the participants behaviour
[32]. These issues are becoming particularly relevant nowa-
days, because demand is no longer perfectly inelastic and con-
sumers are moving towards a flexible and price-sensitive be-
haviour. This has motivated further analyses on the impact
of demand elasticity on pricing [33] and has led to the design
of new tariffs [34] and network charges [35] for systems with
active, price-responsive customers. The points highlighted
above become even more relevant if one considers that the
necessity of new network investments is substantially increas-
ing the tariffs for the consumers. In the case of the UK, it
is expected that the overall tariff payments will increase by
£800 m over the next five years, with a 25% to 50% increase
of the tariffs for commercial and domestic users [36].
1.2. Novel Contributions
Given the substantial increase in both demand flexibil-
ity and tariffs payments in the near future, it is crucial to
establish more efficient methods for allocation and recovery
of transmission costs. In this context, the paper presents
a novel framework for optimal network expansion that uti-
lizes ex-ante tariffs to ensure full recovery of investment costs
(both their fixed and variable components). To the best of
the authors’ knowledge, this represents the first comprehen-
sive effort in transmission network tariff design to account
for price-sensitive market participants by considering the tar-
iff components directly into the investment optimization and
market clearing process. This allows to properly accommo-
date bids and offers of price-elastic agents (i.e. generators
and demand) which under the current ex-post tariffs may be
subject to sub-optimal market outcomes and allocation inef-
ficiencies [32]. These results are obtained by characterizing
the network expansion problem as a non-linear mixed-integer
bilevel optimization. In this formulation, the upper level de-
picts the long-term investment planning problem: the overall
social welfare is maximized while recovering investment costs
from tariffs (determined dynamically) and congestion rent.
In turn, the lower level represents a short-term market clear-
ing problem which takes into account the presence of network
tariffs. By using standard integer algebra, complementarity
properties, and a novel reformulation of the congestion rent,
the proposed bilevel model is recast as a mixed-integer lin-
ear program (MILP) which can be solved with off-the-shelf
solvers without resorting to any iterative algorithm.
To summarize, the main novelties of the proposed ap-
proach are:
• utilization of ex-ante network tariffs, to properly ac-
count for price-elastic market participants;
• dynamic optimal distribution of investment cost recov-
ery between congestion rent and tariffs, with improve-
ments on overall social welfare;
• new formulation of the network planning problem as
a bilevel optimization and design of equivalent MILP
formulation to facilitate numerical resolution;
• a novel characterization of the congestion rent, which
can be recast as a linear expression of dual variables
when lumpy investments are considered.
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1.3. Paper structure
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes the main issues in transmission invest-
ment cost recovery. In particular, the following problems
are discussed: i) the recovery of fixed costs, ii) the presence
of lumpy network investments, and iii) the effect of tariffs
on price-sensitive market participants. Section 3 and 4 in-
troduce the proposed formulation of ex-ante tariffs and the
bilevel model for network planning, respectively. Section 5 re-
casts this model as an equivalent, single MILP problem and
Section 6 presents two case studies to show the main prop-
erties of the proposed approach. Finally, Section 7 outlines
the main conclusions.
2. Transmission Planning: model and challenges
The problem of network expansion is commonly analysed
under a regulated centralized paradigm [9]. The network ex-
pansion is determined by a central network planner with the
purpose of maximizing the total social welfare of the system.
This scheme can be formulated analytically through the fol-
lowing optimization problem [10]:
max
dt,k,gt,p,
um,ft,m,Fm
∑
t∈T
( ∑
k∈ΩDt
Bk(dt,k)−
∑
p∈ΩGt
Cp(gt,p)
)
−
∑
m∈M
um
(
Kfixm +K
var
m Fm
)
(1a)
s.t. ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
gt,p +
∑
m∈M
am,nft,m = 0
∀t ∈ T ,∀n ∈ N (1b)∑
m∈M
ψ`,mft,m = 0 ∀t ∈ T ,∀` ∈ L (1c)
ft,m ≤ F 0m + umFm ∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M (1d)
− umFm − F 0m ≤ ft,m ∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M , (1e)
with um ∈ {0, 1}, 0 ≤ dt,k ≤ dmaxt,k , 0 ≤ gt,p ≤ gmaxt,p ,
ft,m ∈ R, and Fm ≥ 0. With this approach, the central plan-
ner must determine which lines m are expanded (through the
binary variable um) and the amount of additional capacity
on these lines (through the continuous variable Fm). The
values of um and Fm are selected in order to maximize the
objective function in (1a), which represents the total social
welfare of the system and corresponds to the difference be-
tween two main components: i) short-term benefits, equal
to the difference between demand benefits B and generation
costs G, and ii) long-term investment costs, i.e. the costs of
expanding each line m by an additional capacity Fm. The
investment costs include a fixed component Kfixm (incurred if
um = 1 and line m is expanded) and a variable component
Kvarm Fm (proportional to the additional capacity Fm). The
social welfare optimization is subject to the power balance
constraint (1b) at each node n and the Kirchhoff’s voltage
law (1c) on each loop l of the considered network. In addi-
tion, constraints (1d) and (1e) set line flow limits, imposing
that the power flow ft,m (at each time period t and on each
line m) does not exceed the maximum line capacity F 0m+Fm
available after the network expansion, where F 0m is the exist-
ing capacity.
This centralized formulation, which is commonly consid-
ered a starting point in analytical studies on network plan-
ning, exhibits some relevant drawbacks, which are discussed
in the rest of this section.
2.1. Recovery of fixed and variable investment costs
The network expansion investment can be recovered through
the congestion rent (CR) collected on the transmission lines.
Denoted by πt,n the locational marginal price at node n at
time t, i.e. the Lagrange multiplier associated to constraint
(1b), the CR can be expressed as follows:
CR =
∑
t∈T
(πt,nrm − πt,nsm)ft,m (2)
where nsm, n
r
m ∈ N denote the sending and receiving node of
branch m, respectively. A key issue of recovering costs exclu-
sively through the congestion rent CR is that such approach
does not recover fixed costs, even tough the objective func-
tion (1a) accounts for both the fixed and the variable invest-
ment costs. The reason is that the solution obtained in (1)
maximizes the social welfare of all the participants, which is
composed by three components: i) the consumer surplus, ii)
the producer surplus, and iii) the congestion rent [33]. If the
optimal solution of (1) envisages a certain network expansion
(i.e. um = 1), it follows that the resulting investment cost is
lower than the associated social welfare increase. However,
there is no guarantee that the cost (in both its fixed and vari-
able components) will be entirely covered by the CR, which
only constitutes one component of the social welfare. For the
specific case with F 0m = 0 (to neglect previous investments),
the total congestion rent CR in (2) is exactly equal to the
variable costs, regardless of the network topology [37]:
CR =
∑
m∈M
Kvarm Fm. (3)
As a consequence, when the transmission system operator is
entitled to collect only the congestion rent, the fixed costs
Kfixm of the optimal planned network expansion returned by
(1) cannot be recovered, despite the fact that the expansion
actually generates sufficient welfare to cover all the costs.
To further emphasize this point, consider problem (1) over
a single time period for the simple 2-node network in Fig. 1,
whose demand and supply curves are depicted in Fig. 2.
Figure 1: Topology of the 2-node system.
If no connection exists between the two zones, the market
clearing price in the first zone is 80 £/MWh, and 20 £/MWh
in the second zone. In the first zone, for each price lower than
80 £/MWh, some consumers would be willing to buy, but
not enough producers are willing to produce at these prices.
However, this excess demand can be satisfied by importing
energy from the second zone. Define the import curve for
the first zone as the horizontal (energy) difference between
the demand and supply curves in the first zone. This curve
is depicted as the blue line in Fig. 3 for prices lower than
80 £/MWh. Similarly, in the second zone, for each price
4
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
20
40
60
80
100
P
ric
e 
(£
/M
W
h)
Power (MW)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
0
20
40
60
80
100
P
ric
e 
(£
/M
W
h)
Power (MW)
Figure 2: Demand curve in blue and supply curve in red for first (left)
and second (right) market zones.
greater than 20 £/MWh, some producers would be willing to
produce, but not enough consumers are willing to buy. This
excess supply can be exported. Define the export curve as
the horizontal (energy) difference between the supply and the
demand curve in the second zone. This amount is depicted
as a red line in Fig. 3 for prices greater than 20 £/MWh.
The curves reported in Fig. 3 are useful to represent the con-
gestion rent. Suppose now that the two zones are connected
by a transmission line with a maximum capacity of 15 MW.
Assuming a time period of 1 hour, the energy traded between
the two zones is 15 MWh. In this case, the congestion rent
is represented by the grey area in Fig. 3, where the market
price is equal to 60 £/MWh in the first zone and 30 £/MWh
in the second zone. The triangular part above the congestion
rent is the welfare increase due to the importing consumers,
whereas the triangular part below the congestion rent repre-
sents the increase in welfare due to the exporting producers.
The triangular area labelled by L is the dead-weight loss,
i.e., the loss of social welfare caused by the flow limit. The
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Figure 3: The blue curve represents the import demand curve, given by
the horizontal difference between the demand curve and supply curve
in zone 1. The red curve depicts the export supply curve, given by
the horizontal difference between the supply curve and demand curve
in zone 2. The grey area is the congestion rent, whereas the triangular
area marked by L is the dead-weight loss due to the flow limits.
solid line in Fig. 4 represents the difference between the price
curves depicted in Fig. 3. It means that the same deduc-
tions in terms of congestion rent and dead-weight loss can be
obtained by using this curve.
For this simple case with a single time period, the con-
dition ft,m = Fm must hold [37], and relationship between
congestion rent and investment costs can be graphically rep-
resented as in Fig. 4. In model (1), the total investment cost
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Figure 4: The solid line represents the price difference between the
import and export curves in Fig. 3. The horizontal dotted line is the
average variable costs (i.e. Kfixm = 10 £/MWh), whereas the dashed
hyperbole depicts the ATC in (4).
(TC) corresponds to the last term in (1a) and is defined as
TC =
∑
m∈M um(K
fix
m + K
var
m Fm). In this two-zone ex-
ample, the average total cost (ATC) per unit of added line
capacity (if the investment is made, i.e. um = 1), is defined
as follows:
ATC =
TC
Fm
=
Kfixm
Fm
+Kvarm (4)
For Kfixm = 200 £/MWh and K
var
m = 10 £/MWh, the ATC
are depicted as the dashed hyperbole in Fig. 4, whereas the
horizontal dotted line represents the average variable costs,
that are constant and equal to Kvarm in problem (1). The
optimal capacity expansion for the optimization problem (1)
corresponds to the x-value of the intersection between the
average variable costs (dotted line) and the price differential
among the two zones (solid line) when the added line capac-
ity is equal to Fm. In the considered case, the optimal line
expansion is equal to 25 MW and the associated price differ-
ence between the two zones is 10 £/MWh. The congestion
rent and the variable costs are both represented by the grey
rectangular area, and take the same value of 250 £. However,
at this optimal solution of (1), the ATC (dashed hyperbole in
Fig. 4) is equal to 18 £/MWh and the total costs amount to
450 £. As previously discussed, the investment in this case
does not recover the fixed costs Kfixm , equal to 200 £. In or-
der to recover both the fixed and variable costs, the following
revenue adequacy condition must be added to problem (1):
CR ≥ TC =
∑
m∈M
um(K
fix
m +K
var
m Fm) . (5)
The solution of (1) with this additional constraint is repre-
sented in Fig. 5. In this case, the optimal expansion corre-
sponds to the x-value of the intersection between the price dif-
ferential curve (solid line) and the ATC (dashed line), which
also accounts for averaged fixed costs. The optimal value
implies an energy exchange of 20 MWh. The rectangular
grey area is the congestion rent, which is exactly equal to
the total costs, and amounts to 400 £. The consequence
of constraint (5) is a reduction of the inter-zone exchange
from 25 to 20 MWh. The triangular yellow area, labelled by
L, is the reduction in the objective function. The revenue
adequacy constraint, by imposing full recovery of the invest-
ment costs through congestion rent, leads to underinvestment
(from Fm = 25 MW to Fm = 20 MW), and to a reduction of
the overall social welfare of 25 £.
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Figure 5: This figure depicts the same curves as in Fig. 4. The grey rect-
angular area and the triangular yellow area correspond to the congestion
rent CR and the value loss L.
2.2. Lumpy investments
In practice, the capacity expansion on transmission lines
cannot take any arbitrary value and, instead, can only corre-
spond to a finite set of possible discrete options. This com-
plicates the formulation and resolution of problem (1), as the
continuous decision variables Fm are replaced by binary vari-
ables, with a significant computation burden increase. More-
over, lumpiness of capacity expansions exacerbates the issue
of fixed cost recovery and sub-optimality of the resulting so-
lution. Consider again the example presented in Section 2.1
and assume now that the feasible line expansions must take
values in the finite set D = {3 MW, 6 MW, . . . , 30 MW}, with
a discrete step of 3 MW between each option. This means
that the previous optimal solution of 20 MW is not feasible
any more. In this case of lumpy investments, the optimal
solution corresponds to further under-investment and a ca-
pacity expansion of 18 MW, as depicted in Fig. 6. The TC
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Figure 6: Effect of lumpy investment. The traded energy is limited to
18 MWh. The total cost are represented by the are labelled by TC. The
transmission system operator collects an extra-profit from the conges-
tion rent, equal to the red area on top of the total costs. The decrease
in the objective function is represented by the yellow area labelled by
L.
are represented by the grey area. Note that the transmission
system operator collects an extra-profit from the congestion
rent, equal to the red area above the total costs. The further
decrease in the objective function is represented by the yellow
area L, and amounts to 24 £.
Proposition 1. In the presence of fixed costs, if the trans-
mission operator revenue is limited to congestion rent, the
optimal planning problem can lead to a sub-optimal state for
consumers and producers. Lumpy investment exacerbate this
issue. However, consumers and producers could be willing to
bear some costs to compensate the network operator, as long
as the achievable solution leads to a greater surplus.
2.3. Network tariffs and price-sensitive market participants
In the previous section, it has been shown that the recov-
ery of fixed costs in transmission planning problems through
congestion rent leads to under-investments and suboptimal
solutions. To avoid these undesired outcomes, one alterna-
tive option is to directly recover these costs from generators
and consumers, which have benefited from the social wel-
fare increase of the investment. This is generally obtained
by introducing ex-post tariffs, i.e. additional payments from
generation and demand after the market clearing. However,
this solution also presents relevant drawbacks and it can lead
to suboptimal solutions. Consider in fact that demand and
supply market curves in day-ahead markets are price-elastic
[38]. That is, consumers and producers buy and sell differ-
ent quantities at different prices. For consumers, the greater
the price, the smaller the quantity they are willing to buy.
Conversely, for producers, the greater the price, the greater
the quantity they are willing to supply. A fundamental con-
sequence of having market participants with price-sensitive
bids is that any additional cost (applied after the market
clearing process has been determined) can lead to a negative
surplus for some participants.
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Figure 7: Single-zone market with demand depicted as a blue line, and
supply represented as a stepwise red curve. The supply curve is de-
termined by the bids submitted to the market by three producers, la-
belled by A, B, and C, respectively. The intersection of the demand
and supply curves yields the market price, i.e., 10 £/MWh. Assuming
perfect competition, the producers submitted bids are their marginal
costs. Therefore, the profit of producer B is zero, as it both collects and
pays 10 £/MWh.
To see this, consider the single-zone market depicted in
Fig. 7. The stepwise red curve represents the supply market
curve, and it is composed by the three bids submitted by the
producers A, B, and C. Assuming perfect competition, the
bids represent the (constant) marginal costs of the producers,
and are equal to 0, 10, and 20 £/MWh for A, B and C,
respectively. The blue line depicts the demand curve. The
market price is determined by the intersection of the demand
and supply curves, and is equal to 10 £/MWh. All the offered
quantities by producer A are accepted and it sells 10 MWh
of energy. Given the market price of 10 £/MWh and the
marginal cost of zero, the profit of producer A is 100 £. By
contrast, the quantity offered by producer C is not accepted,
because its marginal cost is strictly greater than the market
price, formally, the bid order of producer C is out-of-the-
money [39]. Producer B is the marginal producer [37], and
its bid order price (i.e., its marginal cost) sets the market
price. This means that producer B collects 100 £ as revenues
for selling 10 MWh at 10 £/MWh, but it pays 10 £/MWh
for each unit produced, therefore its profit is zero. This holds
for any marginal producer with constant marginal cost. Now,
suppose that an ex-post network tariff T = 5 £ is charged to
producers. As a consequence of this extra cost, producer B
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pays 105 £ and collects only 100 £. In other words, the ex-
post network tariff translates directly into a 5 £ loss. It could
be argued that, if producer B knew in advance about the tariff
T = 5 £, it could rise the submitted price to 10.5 £/MWh
for its traded energy of 10 MWh. However, this implies a
priori knowledge of the market clearing solution, which is
not the case in a properly functioning market with price-
taker participants. These results hold for any marginal entity,
and can be extended to a more general settings. Recall in
fact that, under a nodal pricing framework, if there are n
congested lines, then there will be n+ 1 marginal units [40].
More generally, if ex-post tariffs are applied, any units whose
surplus is smaller than the ex-post tariff will incur in a loss.
Proposition 2. As long as market participants have elastic
market curves, network tariffs should be considered directly
into the clearing process. This would allow to properly ac-
count for consumers and producers price-sensitive behaviour,
and it would avoid the execution of orders which could results
(ex-post) in a negative surplus.
3. Ex-ante dynamic network tariffs
To overcome the drawbacks of ex-post tariffs, discussed
in Section 2.3, a new type of ex-ante tariff is presented.
This novel cost-recovery scheme is directly considered into
the market clearing process and is related to the traded quan-
tities.
Under the proposed framework, the function Tp(gt,p) rep-
resents the network costs charged to generator p and Cp(gt,p)
corresponds to its generation cost function. Then, the total
costs to be paid by p are Cp(gt,p)+Tp(gt,p) and the marginal
total cost pGt,p is defined as follows:
pGt,p(gt,p) =
∂Cp(gt,p)
∂gt,p
+
∂Tp(gt,p)
∂gt,p
(6)
where gt,p is the produced quantity. The marginal total cost
pGt,p represents the bid price the producer p should submit
to the market under perfect competition. The key feature of
this novel formulation is that, by considering Tp, the effect
of network charges is directly embodied in the producer’s bid
price.
Similarly, assume that the function Tk(dt,k) represents
the network costs charged to consumer k, and Bk(dt,k) its
benefit function before network charges. Then, the net ben-
efit for the consumer k amounts to Bk(dt,k) − Tk(dt,k). In
this case, the actual marginal benefit pDt,k is:
pDt,k(dt,k) =
∂Bk(dt,k)
∂dt,k
− ∂Tk(dt,k)
∂dt,k
(7)
where dt,k is the cleared demand. The value p
D
t,k represents
the bid price the consumer k should submit to the market
under perfect competition.
The fundamental aspect of this new approach is that the
effect of network costs is considered before the actual market
clearing takes place, through the inclusion of ex-ante tariffs
Tp and Tk. Note that these tariffs directly affect the submit-
ted bid prices, which in turn can modify the market equi-
librium (as long as market participants are price-sensitive).
This means that tariffs must be determined by using an op-
timization planning problem that considers also the market
clearing process, to properly account for their effect on both
prices and quantities.
In the proposed formulation (fully detailed in Section 4.1.1),
the charged network costs are expressed as linear functions of
generation and demand, with Tp(gt,p) :=
∑
m∈M τmgt,p, and
Tk(dt,k) :=
∑
m∈M τmdt,k, where τm is the tariff applied to
line m. Therefore, the conditions (6) and (7) can be recast
as follows:
pGt,p = p̃
G
t,p +
∑
m∈M
τm , p
D
t,k = p̃
D
t,k −
∑
m∈M
τm (8)
That is, the bid profile of the generator p is obtained by
shifting its marginal costs over the price axis by a positive
offset, whereas the bid profile of the consumer k is obtained
by shifting its gross marginal benefit over the price axis by a
negative offset to account for tariffs to be paid, as depicted
in Fig. 8. The initial market clearing solution (q1, p1) with
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Figure 8: Assume generation marginal costs as depicted by the red
dashed line, marginal benefit before network costs as represented by
the dashed blue line, and a network tariff of 2 £. Then, the resulting
demand and supply curves are depicted by the blue and red solid lines,
respectively.
market price p1 = 10 £/MWh and accepted power q1 =
15 MW, is changed by the introduction of tariffs, and takes
the new values (q2, p2) for quantity and power, respectively,
as depicted in Fig. 8. Note how the introduction of tariffs
reduces the cleared quantity. This quantity belongs to price-
sensitive consumers and producers who suffer a loss when the
tariffs are applied ex-post, and therefore it is not accepted
when the tariffs are considered ex-ante.
The key point of the proposed scheme is to provide a
mathematical approach to exactly embed network costs (e.g.
tariffs) into participants’ bid profiles, which are then reflected
into the cleared quantities and market prices. In turn, quan-
tities and market prices are used to compute the congestion
rent collected by the transmission system operator, which is
therefore affected by the selected tariffs. This means that, in
the presence of price-sensitive market participants, accepted
quantities, market prices, tariffs and congestion rent are dy-
namically linked, and all these values must be considered si-
multaneously when a network investment planning problem
is solved. For this reason, the proposed scheme is termed
ex-ante dynamic network tariffs.
Proposition 3. Network costs, such as tariffs, should result
in marginal costs of the form as in (6) and (7), in order to
be directly representable by their submitted market bid orders
before the actual market clearing takes place.
4. Network planning problem
In order to address the issues of traditional network plan-
ning approaches, highlighted in Section 2, a novel planning
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paradigm is presented. The purpose of this new formulation
is to determine network expansions that maximize the social
welfare of the system while explicitly accounting for price-
elastic participants and lumpiness of investments. Ex-ante
dynamic network tariffs are used to ensure optimal recovery
of both fixed and variable investment costs.
4.1. Bilevel program for network planning
In order to account for ex-ante dynamic tariffs, the pro-
posed network planning model is structured as a bilevel pro-
gram [41]. A bilevel model can be regarded as two nested
optimization problems, termed upper and lower level prob-
lem. Formally, it is defined as follows:
max
u∈U
F (u, x∗) (9a)
s.t. x∗ ∈ arg max
x∈X
f(x;u) , (9b)
where F is the objective function of the upper level problem
(9a), f is the objective function of the lower level problem
(9b), and U , X are constraint sets. The variables x∗ repre-
sent the optimal solution of the lower level problem, which
depends on the upper level variables u, i.e., x∗= x∗(u). One
important characteristic of a bilevel model is that all the up-
per level variables u enter the lower level as parameters. This
feature can be exploited to recast a bilevel model as a single
mathematical optimization program when specific conditions
hold [42], as detailed in Section 5.1. Bilevel programming is
extensively used in the field of game theory to model Stack-
elberg problems [43]. However, in power system economics,
nested optimization structures are often used to access dual
variables [44, 45, 39, 46], which are related to market prices
according to the marginal pricing theory [47].
The proposed bilevel framework for optimal network plan-
ning, with dynamic ex-ante tariffs for full cost recovery, is
sketched in Fig. 9. The lower level represents the day-ahead
market clearing problem, whereas the upper level represents
the long term investment planning problem. The objective
Market prices πt,n,
flows ft,m, and
quantities dt,k , gt,p
Investment
decision um,
lumpy expansion bFm,j ,
and charge τm
Lower Level
• Objective
Max social welfare
• Purpose
Market clearing
Upper Level
• Objective
Max social welfare
considering investment costs
• Purpose
Enforce revenue adequacy condition
Determine line tariff
Determine line expansion
Figure 9: Bilevel structure of the proposed formulation for optimal net-
work planning. The upper level program represents the long term in-
vestment planning problem. Given the optimal decision variables of
the upper level, which include the investment decision um, the selected
lumpy expansion bFm,j , and the tariff τm, the lower level problem ac-
tually performs a market clearing problem. As a result of the clearing
process the prices πt,n, the flows ft,m, and the executed quantities dt,k
and gt,p are obtained, which are used by the upper level to verify the
revenue adequacy constraint.
of the upper level is to determine the optimal investment
plan by considering both the social welfare and the invest-
ment costs, while enforcing the revenue adequacy condition,
i.e. the recovery of both fixed and variable costs. In the
proposed framework, the transmission operator collects both
the congestion rent, and the tariffs applied to consumers and
producers. The key decision variables of the upper level prob-
lem are: i) the investment decision um, ii) the selected lumpy
capacity expansion bFm,j , and iii) the tariffs τm. Having fixed
these quantities, the lower level problem actually clears the
market, while directly accounting for network tariffs into the
clearing process. As a result of the clearing process, the mar-
ket prices πt,n, the flows ft,m, the executed quantities dt,k and
gt,p are obtained, which are used by the upper level problem
to compute the transmission operator revenues, which are
compared with the investment costs to verify the revenue ad-
equacy condition.
The fundamental feature of the proposed approach is the
explicit inclusion of the network tariffs τm in the lower level
market clearing process, in order to account for price-sensitive
market participants. Since consumers and producers have
elastic market curves, they will demand and offer different
quantities at different prices.
4.1.1. Upper Level
The upper level problem represents a long term invest-
ment planning problem, and is formulated as follows:
max
um,b
F
m,j ,τm
pDt,k,p
G
t,p
∑
t∈T
ωt
( ∑
k∈ΩDt
p̃Dt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt
p̃Gt,pgt,p
)
−
∑
m∈M
(umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j) (10a)
s.t.∑
j∈J
bFm,j = um ∀m ∈M (10b)
pDt,k = p̃
D
t,k −
∑
m∈M
umτmδm,n ∀t ∈ T ,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ ΩDt,n
(10c)
pGt,p = p̃
G
t,p +
∑
m∈M
umτmδm,n ∀t ∈ T , ,∀n ∈ N ,∀p ∈ ΩGt,n
(10d)∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
−ωtam,nπt,nft,m
+
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
ωtumτmδm,n
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dt,k +
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
gt,p
)
≥
∑
m∈M
(umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j) (10e)
um ∈ {0, 1}, bFm,j ∈ {0, 1}, τm ≥ 0, pDt,k ∈ R, pGt,p ∈ R.
(10f)
The objective function (10a) represents the long term so-
cial welfare and accounts for both the fixed investment cost
Kfixm and variable cost K
var
m . The term ωt is a weighting
factor to consider the different time periods involved. The
term F̄m,j represents the lumpy expansion on line m. In the
proposed framework, the line capacity can be increased only
by a finite set of discretised quantities F̄m =
⋃
j∈J F̄m,j .
Constraint (10b) ensures that only one value of F̄m,j is se-
lected if the investment is made. Constraints (10c)-(10d)
introduce the effect of network tariffs into the problem. For
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the case of demand in (10c), the actual marginal benefit pDt,k
of the consumer k at time t is reduced by a quantity τm (i.e.
the imposed tariff) with respect to its initial gross benefit
p̃Dt,k. Equivalently, the market demand curve is reshaped to
account for the additional costs. A similar formulation is
used for generators in (10d), where τ appears with a plus
sign since costs (rather than benefits) are considered. In this
case, the tariffs increase the producer costs, and the market
supply curve is reshaped accordingly. The market curves de-
termined by using pDt,k and p
G
t,p, which embed network costs,
will be used by the lower level problem to perform the mar-
ket clearing. Note that the network tariffs τm do not appear
in (10a), because they are paid by consumers and producers
and collected by the network operator to recover the invest-
ment costs, therefore these monetary flows offset each other
in (10a).
Remark 1. The term δm,n in (10c)-(10d) represents an al-
location factor to account for possible different network cost
distributions between the participants. For example, a postage
stamp-like allocation method could be enforced by imposing
δm,n = 1 ∀m,n. Alternatively, network distribution fac-
tors could be used to account for the different impact of de-
mand/generation at each node on the individual power flows.
Negative values of δm,n imply that a credit is collected.
Constraint (10e) ensures the revenue adequacy of the net-
work expansion. The terms −am,nπt,nft,m refer to the con-
gestion rent (the minus sign is due to the sign convention of
am,n). The remaining terms in the left-hand-side of (10e)
represent the tariffs collected from consumers and producers,
respectively. The terms in the right-hand-side are the fixed
and variable costs of the network expansion. The decision
variables of the upper level problem are um, b
F
m,j , τm, p
D
t,k,
and pGt,p. The terms dt,k, gt,p, and ft,m are the lower level
optimal values, corresponding to the term x∗ in (9).
4.1.2. Lower Level
The lower level problem is a standard market clearing
problem, e.g. day-ahead market, for each time t ∈ T . As long
as the clearing problems are independent, a single program
spanning over all time periods can be formulated as follows:
max
dt,k,gt,p,ft,m
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
pDt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
pGt,pgt,p
)
(11a)
s.t.
dt,k ≤ dmaxt,k ∀t ∈ T ,∀k ∈ ΩDt [ϕ
D,max
t,k ≥ 0] (11b)
gt,p ≤ gmaxt,p ∀t ∈ T ,∀p ∈ ΩGt [ϕ
G,max
t,p ≥ 0] (11c)∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
gt,p +
∑
m∈M
am,nft,m = 0
∀t ∈ T ,∀n ∈ N [πt,n ∈ R]
(11d)∑
m∈M
ψ`,mft,m = 0 ∀t ∈ T ,∀` ∈ L [γt,` ∈ R]
(11e)
ft,m ≤ F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j ∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M [µmaxt,m ≥ 0]
(11f)
− ft,m ≤ F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j ∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M [µmint,m ≥ 0] .
(11g)
Dual variables are reported in square brackets. The objec-
tive function (11a) maximizes the social welfare of the par-
ticipants, while accounting for network tariffs as determined
by (10c)-(10d). That is, the clearing process is performed by
considering all the costs sustained by participants, in order to
properly account for the behaviour of price-elastic consumers
and producers [48, 37]. Constraints (11b)-(11c) impose max-
imum quantity limits. Condition (11d) represents the power
balance in node n at time t. Note that the dual variable πt,n
associated with this constraint represents the market clearing
price according to the marginal pricing framework [47]. Con-
straint (11e) enforces the Kirchhoff’s voltage law. Finally,
constraints (11f)-(11g) determine the flow limits, where F̄m,j
is the lumpy expansion as determined by the upper level. The
decision variables of the lower level problem are dt,k, gt,p, and
ft,m. As outlined in Section 4.1, all the upper level variables
enter the lower level as parameters, therefore (11) is a linear
program, which is a key property to facilitate resolution of
the overall bilevel problem.
5. Resolution method
Bilevel problems like the one presented in (10) and (11)
are often solved iteratively, considering a sequential separate
resolution of their upper and lower level until convergence to
a fixed point [49]. However, this methodology might be time
consuming and does not ensure convergence. For this reason,
in this section we propose a one-shot resolution method ob-
tained by i) recasting the bilevel problem as a single nonlinear
optimization program, ii) introducing a novel and equivalent
reformulation of the congestion rent and iii) using standard
integer algebra to remove critical nonlinearities. The final
result of this analytical process is the MILP presented in Ap-
pendix D, which can be solved with off-the-shelf solvers.
5.1. Single Level Problem
As stated in Section 4.1.2 the lower level problem (11) is
a linear program. As a consequence, it can be equivalently
represented by using its first order necessary and sufficient
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [50]. However, the
KKT complementarity slackness conditions are nonlinear re-
lations. In order to avoid these nonlinearities, the strong
duality property can be used instead of the KKT comple-
mentarity slackness conditions. The analytical details for
this procedure are detailed in Appendix A. The key princi-
ple is that, for a feasible linear program, the strong duality
property holds if and only if all the complementarity slack-
ness conditions hold [51]. The strong duality requires the
equivalence between the primal and dual objective function
values at the optimum, and is reported in (A.4). As a conse-
quence, the proposed bilevel model can be recast as a single
level problem, where the lower level is represented into the
upper level by using its primal constraints (11b)-(11g), its
dual constraints (A.1)-(A.3), and the strong duality property
(A.4). To summarize, the bilevel model described in Section
4.1.1 and Section 4.1.2 can be equivalently recast as a single
9
mathematical optimization program, defined as follows:
max
∑
t∈T
ωt
( ∑
k∈ΩDt
p̃Dt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt
p̃Gt,pgt,p
)
−
∑
m∈M
(umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j) (12a)
(10b)− (10f) (12b)
(11b)− (11g) (12c)
(A.1)− (A.3) (12d)
(A.4) (12e)
where (12b) represents the upper level constraints, (12c) and
(12d) refer to the lower level primal and dual constraints, and
(12e) is the strong duality property. The decision variables
of the single level problem are the upper level variables, and
both the primal and dual lower level variables, i.e., um, b
F
m,j ,
τm, p
D
t,k, p
G
t,p, dt,k, gt,p, ft,m, ϕ
D,max
t,k , ϕ
G,max
t,p , πt,n, γt,`, µ
max
t,m ,
µmint,m . Note that, by recasting the bilevel problem as a single
optimization problem, both lower level primal and dual vari-
ables are accessible within the same optimization problem.
This key design feature is exploited to compute the trans-
mission system operator revenues in (10e). The single level
problem (12) is a nonlinear integer program, Section 5.2 and
Section 5.3 show how all the nonlinearities can be removed.
5.2. Congestion rent recast
This section presents an equivalent characterization of the
congestion rent, derived through optimality conditions. This
novel result allows us to recast the congestion rent as a linear
expression in the presence of lumpy investments. The key
feature of the proposed approach is the use of complementar-
ity conditions to derive an expression of the congestion rent
that does not depend on the flow terms ft,m, which is a key
point. This property will be exploited to recast the whole
bilevel problem as a single MILP program. Indeed, the con-
gestion rent collected by the transmission system operator is
defined as follows:∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
−am,nπt,nft,m , (13)
which is a nonlinear relation, as it involves the products of
market prices πt,n and flows ft,m, i.e. two continuous vari-
ables. However, by exploiting complementarity conditions, it
is possible to recast (13) as follows (see Appendix C):∑
m∈M
(F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j)(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m ) (14)
that can be further rewritten as a linear expression when
lumpy expansions are considered, as described in Section 5.3.
By using (14), the revenue adequacy constraint (10e) can be
recast as follows:∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
ωt(F
0
m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j)(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m )
+
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
ωtumτmδm,n
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
dt,k +
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
gt,p
)
≥
∑
m∈M
(umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j) (15)
5.3. MILP model
By using (15) instead of (10e), only two types of nonlin-
earities remain in the single level problem (12):
1. the products bFm,jµ
max
t,m and b
F
m,jµ
min
t,m involving the bi-
nary variable bFm,j and the continuous variables µ
max
t,m
and µmint,m , in (15) and (A.4).
2. the products umτmdt,k and umτmgt,p involving the bi-
nary variable um and the continuous variables τm, dt,k,
and gt,p, in (15) and (A.4). These nonlinearities appear
in (A.4) when the conditions (10c) and (10d) are used
to replace the terms pDt,k and p
G
t,p.
The nonlinearities of the first type involve only only the
product between one binary variable and one continuous vari-
able, and can be linearized exactly by using standard integer
algebra. For example, the product bx of the binary variable
b, and the continuous variable x with bounds ±M , can be
equivalently replaced by introducing an auxiliary continuous
bounded variable y defined as follows:
−Mb ≤ y ≤ +Mb (16)
−M(1− b) ≤ x− y ≤ +M(1− b) . (17)
Therefore, by exploiting (16)-(17), the nonlinear terms
bFm,jµ
max
t,m and b
F
m,jµ
min
t,m are removed by introducing the aux-
iliary variables yb
Fµ,max
t,m,j and y
bFµ,min
t,m,j , defined in (B.1)-(B.4).
To linearize the second type of nonlinearities, discrete tar-
iff levels are assumed. As a consequence, the term umτm is
replaced by the term
∑
i∈I b
τ
m,iτ̄m,i, with τ̄m,i ∈ R, where
i ∈ I represents the number of possible different tariffs for
each line m, with:∑
i∈I
bτm,i = um ∀m ∈M (18)
bτm,i ∈ {0, 1} ∀m ∈M,∀i ∈ I . (19)
Therefore, the term umτmdt,k and umτmgt,p are replaced by∑
i∈I b
τ
m,iτ̄m,idt,k, and
∑
i∈I b
τ
m,iτ̄m,igt,p, respectively. Then,
the product bτm,idt,k and b
τ
m,igt,p, involving one binary and
one continuous variable, is removed as in (16)-(17) by intro-
ducing the auxiliary variables yb
τd
t,m,i,k and y
bτg
t,m,i,p defined in
(B.5)-(B.8).
Assuming discrete tariff levels, by using (15) instead of
(10e), and introducing the constraints (B.1)-(B.8), all the
nonlinearities of the single level program (12) can be removed,
and the final optimization problem results in a MILP model,
fully reported in Appendix D, which can be solved with off-
the-shelf solvers.
6. Numerical results
The new network planning formulation with ex-ante tar-
iffs is now applied to two different case studies, in order to
assess and discuss its key properties and advantages. The
proposed approach is also compared with other models ref-
erenced in the paper. In particular, the following planning
approaches are considered:
• Centralized Solution (CS): the standard centralized
planning approach, presented in (1).
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• Centralized Solution with revenue adequacy (CSR):
extension of CS where transmission costs must be fully
recovered from congestion rent. This is described by
equations (1) with the additional constraint (5).
• Centralized Solution with revenue adequacy and
lumpy expansion (CSR-L): modification of CSR that
considers lumpy investment decisions. In this case, the
capacity expansion Fm on each line m can only take a
finite set of values in F̄m. Therefore, it is described by
(1), (5) and the following additional constraint:
Fm ∈ F̄m, ∀m ∈M. (20)
• Tariff Solution (TS): the new planning paradigm with
ex-ante dynamic tariffs presented in this paper, which
is fully reported in Appendix D.
In the reported studies, the MILP model of the TS has
been implemented in Python 3.6 with Pyomo 5.6 [52], and
solved with CPLEX 12.8 [53] on a 16-core Intel Xeon CPU,
with 32GB of RAM. To guarantee the optimality of the so-
lution, the absolute and relative Cplex gaps are set to zero.
6.1. 2-node system
The 2-node network represented in Fig. 1 and analysed
in Section 2.1 is now further discussed. Recall that the fixed
cost is assumed equal to Kfixm = 200 £/h and the variable
cost is set to Kvarm = 10 £/MWh. The set of lumpy capacity
expansions used for both the CSR-L and the TS model is
F̄m = {3, 6, 9, . . . 30}. The demand and supply profiles are
fully reported in Fig. 2. Table 1 reports the solutions associ-
ated to each of the four considered investment schemes, i.e.
CS, CSR, CSR-L, and TS. The CS proposes investment on
a line of capacity Fm = 25 MW, as graphically represented
in Fig. 3. This centralized approach leads to a net increase
of 425 £/h in the social welfare of the system with respect
to the initial no-line scenario. The total investment cost re-
quired to achieve this result is equal to 450 £/h, which can be
disaggregated into the variable cost Kvarm Fm = 250 £/h and
fixed cost Kfixm = 200 £/h. The proper recovery and alloca-
tion of this cost remains an open problem. As discussed in
Section 2.1, the congestion rent CR in the expanded network
is equal to 250 £/h and only covers variable costs, causing a
revenue imbalance of −200 £/h. One possibility to recover
this remaining cost term is the introduction of ex-post tariffs,
i.e. additional payments to be made by demand and genera-
tors in exchange for benefiting of the new line. However, as
discussed in Section 2.3, this can lead to a negative surplus
for some participants. In addition, it disincentives truthful
biddings, as shown in [32]. In other words, the CS approach,
with social welfare increase of 425 £/h, does not properly
address the key issue of full cost recovery for the network
expansion.
The alternative approach considered in CSR is to explic-
itly impose full cost recovery by using the collected conges-
tion rent, through the additional constraint (5). Comparison
between CS and CSR shows the following:
• A smaller expansion of Fm = 20 MW is performed in
the CSR case, as represented in Fig. 5.
• The underinvestment leads to a higher price differential
between the two areas.
• This increases the congestion rent to 400 £/h, which
now fully covers the investment costs, i.e. the variable
cost Kvarm Fm = 200 £/h plus the fixed cost K
fix
m = 200
£/h.
• The underinvestment reduces the net social welfare in-
crease, which in the CSR is equal to 400 £/h (compared
to 425 £/h in the CS case).
To summarize, the CRS is able to ensure full cost recovery
by using exclusively the collected congestion rent. However,
this is achieved at the cost of a reduced social welfare.
The drawbacks of the CRS are exacerbated in the CRS-
L scenario, when lumpy investments are considered and the
capacity expansion of the line can only take a finite number
of values. In this case, the line expansion is smaller and equal
to Fm = 18 MW (see Fig. 6), since the value of 20 MW of the
CSR case cannot be selected. This implies that the collected
congestion rent increase even further to 432 £/h, leading to
a positive revenue imbalance of +52 £/h (red area in Fig. 6).
As expected, the CRS-L has a smaller net benefit increase of
the overall social welfare, which amounts to only 376 £/h.
Finally, the last row in Table 1 reports the solution ob-
tained by using the proposed TS approach. It involves 203
binary variables and is solved in 1107.40 seconds. In this case,
the selected network expansion Fm = 21 MW is greater than
the one in both the CSR and CSR-L case. As a result, the
smaller congestion rent of 371 £/h does not fully cover the
investment costs of 410 £/h. The remaining difference of 39
£/h is obtained by applying a tariff τ = 0.357 £/MWh. This
corresponds to a price increase in demand payments (and a
price decrease for generation revenues). In other words, de-
mand and generation sustain an additional cost in exchange
for the (greater) benefits of the expanded line. A key ad-
vantage of this approach is the greater net increase in social
welfare (equal to 409£/h) with respect to CSR and CSR-L.
This is obtained by introducing an additional degree of free-
dom in the problem of recovering investment costs: through
the introduction of the tariff τ , these costs are not entirely
covered by the congestion rent but can in part be sustained by
the agents (demand and generation) which benefit from the
investment. Notice that the distribution of the cost recovery
(between congestion rent and demand/generation payments)
is determined by τ , which is chosen with the purpose of max-
imizing the overall social welfare in (10a).
For comparison, the results with ex-post tariff can be ob-
tained by using the CS model, and imposing the expansion
of 21 MW. The key difference between the two outcomes is
that in the ex-ante solution the quantity cleared is smaller by
0.53 MWh. This quantity belongs to participants that suffer
a loss when the tariff is applied ex-post, and quit the market
when the tariff is applied ex-ante.
6.2. Garver’s 6-node system
The comparison of the different investment strategies is
now extended to a more complex network with a significantly
larger number of generators and consumers. The case study is
based on the Garver’s 6-node system depicted in Fig. 10 [54].
This network has 6 nodes and 8 lines, i.e. N = {1, . . . , 6} and
M = {1, . . . , 8}. The solid lines from 1 to 6 in Fig. 10 rep-
resent existing branches that can be expanded, i.e. F 0m > 0
for all m ∈ {1, . . . , 6}. The dashed lines 7 and 8 are new
branches that can be built, i.e. F 0m = 0 for m ∈ {7, 8}. In
this example, two time periods T = {1, 2} are considered.
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Table 1: Results of different network expansion schemes applied to the 2-node system.
Reference
model
Expansion
Fm (or F̄m,j)
Social Welfare
increase
Investment
Cost
Congestion
Rent
Tariff
τm
Tariff
Payments
Revenue
imbalance
CS 25 425 450 250 0 0 -200
CSR 20 400 400 400 0 0 0
CSR-L 18 376 380 432 0 0 52
TS 21 409 410 371 0.357 39 0
Table 2: Results of different network expansion schemes applied to the Garver’s 6-node system.
Reference
Model
Expansion Social
Welfare
Investment
Cost
Congestion
Rent
Tariff Tot. Tariff
Payments
Revenue
ImbalanceF7 F8 τ7 τ8
CS 55.51 44.27 21774.38 499.3 299.3 0 0 0 -200
CSR 50.15 39.91 21762.54 470.2 470.2 0 0 0 0
CSR-L 50.00 40.00 21762.39 470.0 471.6 0 0 0 1.6
TS 53.00 48.00 21765.11 503.0 275.2 0.0419 0.0419 227.8 0
Figure 10: Garver’s 6-node network topology.
To properly depict elastic market curves, 1000 consumers
and 1000 generators are considered at each node, with the
exception of node 6, where only generators are present. The
values of p̃Dt,k and p̃
G
t,p are sampled from a normal distribution
with mean 50 £/MWh and standard deviation 10 £/MWh.
The limits dmaxt,k and g
max
t,p on demand and supply bids are
obtained from an uniform distribution ranging from zero to
500 kW. The set of lumpy capacity expansions is defined as
F̄m ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 200}. The line reactance, existing capacity
F 0m, and variable cost K
var
m are reported for each branch in
Fig. 10. The fixed investment cost is Kfixm = 100 £/h for all
m ∈M.
Table 2 reports the solutions associated to each of the
four considered schemes (i.e., CS, CSR, CSR-L and TS).
The optimal solution obtained by using the CS scheme shows
that only the lines 7 and 8 are built, with F̄7 = 55.51 MW
and F̄8 = 44.27 MW, leading to a welfare of 21774.38 £/h.
The total investment cost amounts to 499.3 £/h, given by
the fixed investment cost of Kfixm = 100 £/h and K
var
m =
3 £/MWh for both the lines. In this case, the congestion
rent is 299.3 £/h and, as expected, it exactly covers the vari-
able investment costs, but not the fixed costs. As a result,
the revenue imbalance is negative, and equal to −200 £/h. In
order to ensure the recovery of all the investment costs, the
CRS scheme with the additional revenue adequacy constraint
(5) is considered, with the associated solution reported in the
second row of Table 2. In this case, as one would expect, the
line expansions are smaller: line 7 is built with F̄7 = 50.15
MW, whereas line 8 is built with F̄8 = 39.91 MW. As a result,
the welfare decreases to 21762.54 £. However, due to the un-
derinvestment, the congestion rent rises to 470.2 £/h, and ex-
actly covers all the investment costs. When the set of lumpy
capacity expansions F̄m ∈ {1, 2, 3, . . . , 200} is considered in
the CSR-L scheme, the social welfare decreases even further.
In this case, line 7 is built with F̄7 = 50 MW, whereas line 8
is built with F̄8 = 40 MW. As a result of lumpiness, a lower
value of social welfare is obtained (21762.39 £) and extra-
profit is collected by the transmission operator, leading to a
strictly positive revenue imbalance of 1.6 £/h.
The last row in Table 2 reports the solution associated to
the proposed scheme TS with ex-ante network tariffs. It in-
volves 1696 binary variables and is solved in 4458.26 seconds.
In this case, line 7 is built with F̄7 = 53 MW, whereas line
8 is built with F̄8 = 48 MW. Three main elements should be
emphasized in this case:
• The social welfare is equal to 21765.11 £/h and it is
greater than both the CSR-L and CSR cases.
• By imposing an ex-ante tariff equal to 0.0419 £/MWh
and directly recovering part of the investment costs
from generators and customers, the TS avoids the neg-
ative revenue imbalance arising in the CS scenario.
• The CSR and the TS have both a revenue imbalance
(i.e. the surplus of the transmission operator) equal
to zero. This means that, in the TS, the increase in
social welfare with respect to the CRS case is entirely
collected by consumers and producers. In other words,
despite the additional tariff payment, the condition of
the market participants improves thanks to the optimal
distribution of the investment cost recovery between the
tariff and congestion rent component.
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6.3. Investment and economic trends
From the numerical case studies presented above, it is
possible to draw some general comparisons between the plan-
ning solutions and emphasize the advantages of the proposed
ex-ante dynamic tariffs. Regarding the Centralized Solution
(CS), it can be seen that it achieves the highest improve-
ment in overall social welfare, both in the 2-bus and 6-bus
networks. However, such improvement is obtained at the ex-
pense of a negative revenue imbalance. The overall social
welfare is reduced when the full recovery of costs is included
as a constraint in the CSR, as underinvestment is performed
to lower costs and increase congestion revenues. For exam-
ple, the social welfare of the CSR in the 2-bus network is
5.6% lower than in the CS case. Similarly, in the Garver sys-
tem, the additional social welfare of the network expansion
with the CSR is 0.05% lower. This trend is even more ev-
ident when lumpy expansions are considered in the CSR-L
solution.
Within this framework, the new proposed solution TS
achieves significant improvements. Thanks to the introduc-
tion of dynamic network tariffs, only a fraction of the invest-
ment cost needs to be recovered through congestion revenues
(the 90% and the 54.7% in the 2-node and 6-node network,
respectively). This means that network costs can be fully
recovered without resorting to underinvestment, which leads
to higher social welfare. With respect to the CSR-L case,
the network investments in the TS are greater by 7.9% in the
2-node network and by 7% in the Garver system. As a result,
the social welfare metric is improved by 8.7% and 0.01 % in
the 2-node and 6-node network, respectively.
7. Conclusion
Current paradigms for the recovery of investment costs
in transmission network planning exhibit substantial issues.
In particular, the use of ex-post network tariffs can lead to
several inefficiencies in the form of cleared orders with a neg-
ative surplus and mistrustful biddings. These problems are
also exacerbated by the current trends of increasing price-
elasticity of demand. To overcome these issues, the proposed
approach introduces ex-ante dynamic network tariffs, which
can be exactly embodied in the market participants’ submit-
ted bids before the market clearing actually takes place, and
are directly related to the cleared quantity. These ex-ante
tariffs are incorporated in a novel formulation of the long-
term network planning problem which returns the optimized
network investments and, at the same time, determines the
optimal repartition of the associated costs between conges-
tion revenues and tariff payments.
The paper demonstrates that ex-ante dynamic network
tariffs can be used effectively to account for the increas-
ing price-elasticity of demand in the network planning prob-
lem while avoiding undesired phenomena such as mistrustful
bidding and negative surplus for generators and consumers.
Through the application of standard linear algebra, comple-
mentarity properties and a reformulation of the congestion
rent, it has been shown that the network planning problem
with ex-ante tariffs can be formulated as a standard mixed-
integer linear problem. This ensures optimality while pre-
serving key features of the transmission expansion decisions,
such as lumpiness of the investments. Finally and most im-
portantly, it has been demonstrated with relevant case studies
that the use of ex-ante network tariffs i) ensures full recov-
ery of the investment costs and ii) guarantees an increased
efficiency of the network investments and an improvement of
the social welfare when price-elastic demand is considered.
Further work will investigate more complex formulations
of the ex-ante tariffs, evaluating how different allocation fac-
tors and tariff specifications affect the optimal network ex-
pansion and the fairness of cost repartition. In particular, a
comparison with existing tariff allocation approaches, such as
the flow-based MW-mile method, is the subject of an ongoing
companion paper. More realistic and comprehensive models
will also be considered. Future research will move from the
current deterministic approach to a stochastic model which
takes into account key factors such as wind availability, sys-
tem load and demand price-sensitivity, whose evolutions on
long time scales are not perfectly known a priori. The analy-
sis will also incorporate relevant operational constraints such
as ramp rates and minimum up/down time. Finally, the mod-
elling framework will be expanded to also consider generation
expansion decisions and capture the physical and economical
interactions between generation and transmission planning.
Appendix A. Dual constraints and strong duality
The dual constraints of the lower level problem (11) are
defined as follows. In particular, the dual constraints of the
primal variables dt,k ≥ 0 and gt,p ≥ 0 are, respectively:
ϕD,maxt,k + πt,n ≥ p
D
t,k ∀t ∈ T ,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ ΩDt,n (A.1)
ϕG,maxt,p − πt,n ≥ −pGt,p ∀t ∈ T ,∀n ∈ N ,∀p ∈ ΩGt,n , (A.2)
The dual constraint associated with the flow variable ft,m ∈
R is defined as:∑
n∈N
am,nπt,n +
∑
`∈L
ψ`,mγt,` + µ
max
t,m − µmint,m = 0
∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M . (A.3)
The strong duality property of the lower level problem
(11) requires the equivalence between the primal and dual
objective function values, and is defined as follows:∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
( ∑
k∈ΩDt,n
pDt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
pGt,pgt,p
)
=
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈ΩDt
ϕD,maxt,k d
max
t,k +
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈ΩGt
ϕG,maxt,p g
max
t,p
+
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
(
F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j
)(
µmaxt,m + µ
min
t,m
)
(A.4)
Appendix B. Auxiliary constraints
The following constraints are used to define to the auxil-
iary variables yb
Fµ,max
t,m,j and y
bFµ,min
t,m,j
0 ≤ yb
Fµ,max
t,m,j ≤Mb
F
m,j ∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M,∀j ∈ J (B.1)
0 ≤ µmaxt,m − y
bFµ,max
t,m,j ≤M(1− b
F
m,j)
∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M,∀j ∈ J (B.2)
0 ≤ yb
Fµ,min
t,m,j ≤Mb
F
m,j ∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M,∀j ∈ J (B.3)
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0 ≤ µmint,m − y
bFµ,min
t,m,j ≤M(1− b
F
m,j)
∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M,∀j ∈ J , (B.4)
where M is set equal to the maximum allowed bid price.
The following constraints are used to define to the auxil-
iary variables yb
τd
t,m,i,k and y
bτg
t,m,i,p
0 ≤ yb
τd
t,m,i,k ≤ dmaxt,k bτm,i ∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M,∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ ΩDt
(B.5)
0 ≤ dt,k − yb
τd
t,m,i,k ≤ dmaxt,k (1− bτm,i)
∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M,∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ ΩDt (B.6)
0 ≤ yb
τg
t,m,i,p ≤ g
max
t,p b
τ
m,i ∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M,∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ ΩGt
(B.7)
0 ≤ gt,p − yb
τg
t,m,i,p ≤ g
max
t,p (1− bτm,i)
∀t ∈ T ,∀m ∈M,∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ ΩGt
(B.8)
Appendix C. Congestion Recast
This section shows how the congestion rent (13) can be
recast as (14). In detail, from the dual constraint (A.3), the
following relation can be obtained:
−
∑
n∈N
am,nπt,n =
∑
`∈L
ψ`,mγt,` + µ
max
t,m − µmint,m . (C.1)
Furthermore, the strong duality property, used to obtain the
single level problem in Section 5.1, guarantees that all of
the complementarity slackness conditions hold at the opti-
mum. Therefore, any of these conditions can be used. In
particular, the complementarity slackness conditions related
to constraints (11f) and (11g) are defined as follows:
ft,mµ
max
t,m = (F
0
m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j)µ
max
t,m (C.2)
−ft,mµmint,m = (F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j)µ
min
t,m (C.3)
Therefore, the congestion rent (13) can be recast as follows:∑
m∈M
∑
n∈N
−am,nπt,nft,m
(C.1)
=
∑
m∈M
∑
`∈L
ψ`,mγt,`ft,m +
∑
m∈M
(µmaxt,m − µmint,m )ft,m
(C.2)−(C.3)
=∑
m∈M
∑
`∈L
ψ`,mγt,`ft,m
+
∑
m∈M
(F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j)(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m ) =∑
`∈L
γt,`(
∑
m∈M
ψ`,mft,m)
+
∑
m∈M
(F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j)(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m )
(11e)
=
∑
m∈M
(F 0m +
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j)(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m ) , (C.4)
where the first equality is due to (C.1), the second equality is
due to the complementarity conditions (C.2)-(C.3), whereas
the last equality is due to the Kirchhoff’s voltage law con-
straint (11e). Note that the condition (11e) holds for any
loop `. This means that the equivalence obtained in (C.4)
holds not only at system level, but also for any loop ` at time
t. Furthermore, it involves only the products of the binary
variable bFm,j and the continuous variables µ
max
t,m and µ
min
t,m ,
which can be linearized using standard integer algebra, as
described in the Section 5.3.
Appendix D. Final MILP model
The following appendix reports the complete MILP model
after that all the nonlinearities have been removed.
max
∑
t∈T
ωt
( ∑
k∈ΩDt
p̃Dt,kdt,k −
∑
p∈ΩGt
p̃Gt,pgt,p
)
−
∑
m∈M
(
umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j
)
(D.1)
s.t.
(10b) (D.2)∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
ωtF
0
m(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m )
+
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
j∈J
ωtF̄m,j(y
bFµ,max
t,m,j + y
bFµ,min
t,m,j )
+
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈I
∑
k∈ΩDt,n
ωtτ̄m,iδm,ny
bτd
t,m,i,k
+
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈I
∑
p∈ΩGt,n
ωtτ̄m,iδm,ny
bτg
t,m,i,p ≥
∑
m∈M
(
umK
fix
m +K
var
m
∑
j∈J
bFm,jF̄m,j
)
(D.3)
(11b)− (11g) (D.4)
ϕD,maxt,k + πt,n ≥ p̃
D
t,k −
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈I
bτm,iτ̄m,iδm,n
∀t ∈ T ,∀n ∈ N ,∀k ∈ ΩDt,n (D.5)
ϕG,maxt,p − πt,n ≥ −
(
p̃Gt,p +
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈I
bτm,iτ̄m,iδm,n
)
∀t ∈ T ,∀n ∈ N ,∀p ∈ ΩGt,n (D.6)
(A.3) (D.7)∑
t∈T
( ∑
k∈ΩDt
(
p̃Dt,kdt,k −
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈I
τ̄m,iy
bτd
t,m,i,kδm,n
)
−
∑
p∈ΩGt
(
p̃Gt,pgt,p +
∑
m∈M
∑
i∈I
τ̄m,iy
bτg
t,m,i,pδm,n
))
=
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈ΩDt
ϕD,maxt,k d
max
t,k +
∑
t∈T
∑
p∈ΩGt
ϕG,maxt,p g
max
t,p
+
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
F 0m(µ
max
t,m + µ
min
t,m )
+
∑
t∈T
∑
m∈M
∑
j∈J
F̄m,j(y
bFµ,max
t,m,j + y
bFµ,min
t,m,j ) (D.8)
(18)− (19) (D.9)
(B.1)− (B.8) (D.10)
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